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REVIEW ESSAYS

full-bodied cyber without the hype

Sam J. Tangredi

Cyberspace in Peace and War, by Martin C. Libicki. Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016. 478 pages. $55.

As a fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense
University in the early 1990s, Martin Libicki was one of the first defense analysts
to write on the security implications of information warfare and the Internet. His
monographs The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict in a Time of
Free Silicon (1994) and What Is Information Warfare? (1995) were considered
cutting-edge treatments, containing such recommendations as making heavy
investments in smart sensors and establishing a corps of information warriors.
Many of his recommendations were met with varying degrees of skepticism
at the time. In a review of The Mesh and the Net in the July–August 1994 edition
of the prestigious policy journal Foreign Affairs, Professor Eliot Cohen displayed
a retrospectively humorous lack of prescience by stating that Libicki’s “proposed
courses of action—the creation of a corps of inforDr. Sam J. Tangredi is a professor of national, naval, mation warriors, among others—make less sense
and maritime strategy and the recently appointed
than the author thinks. It would have made as
inaugural Leidos Chair of Future Warfare Studies
at the Naval War College. A retired Navy captain,
much sense to create a corps of combustion engine
his active-duty billets included serving as head of
warriors early in the twentieth century.” What a
the Strategy and Concepts Branch of the Office of the
difference a couple of decades can bring.
Chief of Naval Operations and director of strategic
planning and business development for the Navy
Yet, throughout his early studies, Libicki himInternational Programs Office, in addition to comself remained skeptical that American civil inframand at sea. He is the author of numerous articles
on strategy and defense policy and has published five structure would face a major cyberwarfare threat.
books, including Anti-access Warfare: Countering
As he states in the introduction to Cyberspace
A2/AD Strategies (Naval Institute Press, 2013).
in Peace and War, “Then, as now, it was hard to
conclude that cyberwar was going to trump every
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other form of warfare. I was confident that the threat from cyberspace could be
contained, in part because I believed that people, aware of the threat, would not
willy-nilly connect critical systems (such as those that supply electric power) to
the Internet. In this, I was wrong” (p. 1). Once Libicki recognized how wrong his
assumption was and how vulnerable American companies would make themselves for the sake of cost cutting, profit, and expediency, he built an influential
career analyzing the topic of information warfare and cyber war, primarily as a
senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation. At RAND he has written or
contributed to over a half-dozen studies sponsored by the Department of Defense. At the time of this book’s publication, he also was a distinguished visiting
professor in cybersecurity studies at the U.S. Naval Academy.
Drawing on his studies, previous work, articles, and reports, Libicki built
Cyberspace in Peace and War into his masterwork, one of the most extensive
yet clearly written compendiums on cybered threats, attacks, strategies, and
vulnerabilities. At 478 pages, it looks like an encyclopedic manual—albeit with
a well-written narrative—and in a sense it is. It may not have the conceptual
depth of Chris C. Demchak’s Wars of Disruption and Resilience: Cybered Conflict,
Power, and National Security (2011) or the breezy, popular approach of P. W.
Singer and Allan Friedman’s Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs
to Know (2014). Rather, it has thoroughness; there seems to be not a single cybered conflict topic that Libicki does not address in some detail, from “How to
Compromise a Computer” (chapter 3) to “Sino-American Relations and Norms
in Cyberspace” (chapter 33).
Libicki refers to his book as a “text” intended to “make readers more intelligent consumers of the news, more intelligent users of technical advice, and more
intelligent critics of the decisions that countries make with respect to the threat
from cyberspace” (p. 3). As is apparent, it is not a book for cyber specialists, who
presumably know more than the basics of the author’s long list of cybered topics.
But it is a book for all others, particularly national security professionals who
want an extremely comprehensive initial immersion into the subject. Libicki
indeed scores a “hat trick” on his three goals.
The book’s format is eminently logical, with thirty-four chapters divided
into five sections. In the first section, “Foundations,” Libicki discusses types of
cybered attacks, methods of providing security, and what governments can and
cannot do in terms of defense. The second section, “Policies,” begins with an
examination of cyber espionage, system vulnerabilities, and how an operational
cyber war might begin—Libicki sees surprise attack as a likely scenario. Section
3, “Operations,” views the conduct of cybered war in terms of an organized campaign that may or may not include kinetic effects.
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It will be most surprising to die-hard proponents of the belief that “cyber is
its own warfighting domain equal to land, sea, air, and space” that Libicki—with
his long study of information warfare—disagrees with this approach, declaring
that there is “no domain, no cyber equivalent of Billy Mitchell” (p. 165). Libicki
instead states, “The desire to see cyberspace as a warfighting domain is deeply
ingrained in doctrine and the minds of those who carry out such doctrine. This
chapter argues that this concept is misleading, perhaps pernicious[;] . . . if cyberspace is not a ‘domain,’ what is it? [O]ne answer may be that ‘it’ is a set of tools that
have a related set of objectives in common” (p. 167). In answering the argument
that the military needs to assess cyber as if it were a domain if it is to properly
man, train, and equip to fight in it, Libicki replies simply, “Militaries do this
for electronic warfare without its having been elevated into a separate domain”
(p. 167).
Section 4, “Strategies,” expounds on both symmetric and asymmetric responses to cyber attack and the potential for escalation into kinetic warfare, and
then focuses on the deterrence of such attacks, examining deterrence topics such
as attribution, the will to retaliate, and punishment or denial. In the concluding
chapter of this section, the author examines the outcome of cyber attacks against
an opponent’s nuclear command-and-control systems. Those who think that
there should be an arms-control regime to prohibit this may be disappointed
by Libicki’s conclusion that the “low odds of making cyberwar work” against a
hardened (and isolated) nuclear command-and-control system makes such a
diplomatic effort essentially irrelevant.
Section 5 concludes the book by examining norms in cyberspace—with particular attention given to the Tallinn Manual, a document that the Naval War
College Stockton Center for International Law played a major role in creating—
and Sino-American discussions. During People’s Republic of China president Xi
Jinping’s visit to the White House in September 2015, he and President Barack
H. Obama announced, “The United States and China agree that neither country’s
government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property . . . with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors” (pp. 344–45). But notably there was no agreement on
an enforcement mechanism or the use of cyber espionage for military purposes.
Libicki seems agnostic about the effectiveness of norms.
One of the questions this worthy book poses but deliberately leaves unanswered for readers to debate as a “fundamental question for U.S. policy” is whether “it is more important [for the United States] to pursue advantage in cyberspace
(for both espionage and attack) or to make cyberspace more secure for everyone”
(p. 350). That is indeed a question for extensive debate, although it does raise a
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second question: Can cyberspace really be made “secure”? On this question, the
conclusion of Cyberspace in Peace and War seems to be “not really.” As Libicki
implies, the choice to make cyberspace an insecure tool for infrastructure control
was a matter of choosing a bad bed in which we now must lie, while constantly
straining to prevent somebody (hackers, opposing governments, and others)
from yanking off the covers. That dire scenario makes one want to pull the plug.
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